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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the effects of economic size and trade openness on tax design in 
the OECD.  Using data for thirty OECD countries over the 1965-2007 period, we test the 
recently proposed Hines-Summers [2009] Hypothesis, according to which the smaller the 
size and the greater the openness of the economy, the more it will rely on expenditure 
taxes and the less on income taxes.  Our findings show that the Hines-Summers 
Hypothesis can claim broad, statistically significant, and robust empirical support in the 
OECD data sets we examined. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
The OECD countries have been raising tax revenues in remarkably different 
ways.  For example, the United States and Japan raise almost half of total revenue with 
income taxes and less than one-fifth by expenditure taxes (taxes on goods and services).  
On the other hand, Mexico and Korea rely on expenditure taxes for half of their revenue, 
and income taxes for around one-quarter. 
What can account for such marked differences?  In a recent contribution, Hines 
and Summers [2009] argue that differences in tax design can be attributed to differences 
in country size and trade openness.  Their argument is simple, but very intuitive.  Because 
of globalization, governments find themselves operating in an environment of increasing 
mobility of economic activity and factors of production.  As a result, countries which are 
small and open have tax bases that are more mobile than countries that are larger or less 
open.  Therefore, small open countries have an incentive to rely less on income taxes and 
more on expenditure taxes, compared to larger and less open economies.  Indeed, the 
smaller the size and the greater the openness of the economy, the more it will rely on 
expenditure taxes and the less on income taxes.  We call this the Hines-Summers 
Hypothesis. 
The implications of the Hines-Summers Hypothesis are clearly important.  First, it 
is well known that income taxes and expenditure taxes have very different properties both 
in terms of economic efficiency and distributional equity.  In particular, income taxes are 
generally more distortionary, but expenditure taxes are usually less progressive. The 
Hines-Summers Hypothesis is also important because of its policy implications in a 
world of increasing mobility of economic factors. 
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The literature on globalization and tax design has generally focused on tax 
competition as an outcome of increasing factor mobility [OECD, 2008].1  In the fact of 
tax competition, national government will reduce their autonomy both in terms of rising 
taxes and in the provision of public goods [Wilson, 1986; Zodrow et al. 1986].  
Moreover, tax competition is likely to increase the convergence and harmonization of the 
tax systems among countries,2 in order to reduce negative spillover effects that 
government decision of one country can have on other countries.3  
More recently, according to the Hiners-Summers Hypothesis, another effect of 
globalization on tax design is expected to occur through changes in the share of income 
and expenditure taxes as a result of an increasing degree of openness. 
The purpose of the present paper is to test the validity of the Hines-Summers 
Hypothesis for the OECD countries.  In particular, we will try to assess whether the 
fraction of revenue raised by income taxes is indeed increasing with country size and 
decreasing with trade openness, while the fraction raised by expenditure taxes is 
decreasing with country size and increasing with trade openness. 
To this purpose we use annual data for a set of thirty OECD countries for most of 
which we have data from 1965 to 2007.   
Our results are broadly consistent with the Hines-Summers hypothesis.  Thus, the 
evidence suggests that higher economic size is associated with increased reliance on 
income taxes and reduced reliance on consumption taxes, while the opposite holds true 
for greater trade or financial openness.  Moreover, our estimates are quantitatively 
substantial, statistically significant, and robust. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section describes the 
empirical methodology and the data we use to assess the effects of country size and trade 
openness on tax design.  The third section presents and discusses the empirical results, 
and the fourth section concludes. 
 
 
DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
All tax data are from the Revenue Statistics of OECD database.  For country i and 
year t, we use tiT ,  to denote total tax revenue, 
Y
tiT ,  for revenue from income taxes (defined as 
taxes on income, profits, and capital gains), and EtiT ,  for revenue from expenditure taxes 
(defined as taxes on goods and services).  Then we construct the fractions of tax revenue 
raised by income or expenditure taxes as: 
ti
Y
tiY
ti T
T
,
,
, =τ                                                       (1) 
and 
ti
E
tiE
ti T
T
,
,
, =τ                                                                   (2) 
respectively.4 
For economic size, we mostly use a country’s relative economic activity, which 
we measure by the country’s real GDP as a fraction of the group’s total real GDP: 
∑
=
i
ti
ti
ti GDP
GDP
size
,
,
,                                                      (3) 
As will be discussed below, the alternative measure of population size will also be used, 
as in Hines and Summers [2009]. 
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 Finally, for openness we first rely on the usual construct of trade openness, given 
by the ratio of total trade (exports plus imports) to GDP: 
ti
titi
ti GDP
IMEX
open
,
,,
,
+
=                                               (4) 
In the next section we will also consider two measures of financial openness, as well. 
Data on GDP, exports and imports are from the OECD Analytical Database. 
Table 1 provides a list of the 30 OECD economies together with country averages 
for our basic series.5  For 23 of these countries (in bold on Table 1), the data are available 
for the entire 1965-2007 period – we call this set of countries the Full-Data Countries. 
Table 1 displays the sizable differences in tax design across these countries.  
Focusing on the Full-Data Countries, for example, the fraction of tax revenue from 
income taxes has varied from 18% in Greece to 57% in Denmark.  The fraction of 
expenditure taxes has ranged from 18% of GDP in Japan to 44% of GDP in Ireland.   
At the same time, economic size and trade openness also differ substantially.  As 
expected, the US is both the largest economy, accounting for 38% of the group’s GDP, 
and the less open, with total trade (imports plus exports) equal to 19% of domestic GDP.  
Japan is the second largest economy, while at the other end there are several countries 
with economic size around 1% or less of group GDP.  The most open economy in the 
sample is Luxembourg, with total trade equal to 200% of domestic GDP.  As expected, 
the correlation between economic size and trade openness is negative.6 
<<Table 1 here>> 
In order to assess more formally the effects of country size and trade openness on 
tax design, we will estimate models of the basic form: 
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Y
titititi
Y
ti opensize ,,,2,10, εααατ ++++= Xγ'   (5) 
and 
     Etitititi
E
ti opensize ,,,2,10, εβββτ ++++= Xδ'                      (6) 
where the α ’s,
 
β ’s,
 
γ ’s, and
 
δ ’s are parameters to be estimated, and X  is a set of 
demographic, macroeconomic and political controls including: i) population; ii) rural 
population; iii) population density; iv) unemployment rate; v) a measure of income 
inequality (the Gini coefficient of income distribution); vi) a dummy variable that takes a 
value equal to 1 for a presidential regime and zero otherwise; vii) a dummy that takes a 
value equal to 1 for a proportional parliamentary system and zero otherwise; and viii) a 
dummy that takes a value equal to 1 for left government and zero otherwise.  The error 
terms Yti ,ε
 
and Eti ,ε
 
are modeled as Yti
Y
t
Y
i
Y
ti v ,, ++= λµε  and 
E
ti
E
t
E
i
E
ti v ,, ++= λµε  , where 
the µ ’s and λ ’s can be estimated as fixed or random effects.  
Thus, an additional difference between our paper and Hines-Summers [2009] is 
that we include both size and openness in the estimated models simultaneously.  Note that 
the Hines-Summers Hypothesis predicts 1α
 
> 0, 2α  < 0, 1β  < 0, and 2β  > 0. 
RESULTS 
The estimation results of equations (5) and (6) are displayed in Tables 2 and 3.   
All models have been estimated both for the entire sample of 30 economies and for the 23 
countries in the Full-Data sample, but the tables focus on the full-sample results to 
preserve space. 
 Starting with Table 2, the dependent variable is , the fraction from income 
taxes.  Column (1) of the table reports the estimation results obtained when the fraction 
from income taxes is regressed only on openness and size.  The estimated coefficient of 
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size is statically significant and positive, and therefore consistent with the Hines-
Summers Hypothesis.  The coefficient of openness is negative, as predicted by the theory, 
but not statistically significant at 10%.  Country fixed effects are jointly statistically 
significant and the high R2 suggests that a large part of the variation of the fraction from 
income taxes is explained.  
<<Table 2 here>> 
At the same time, however, additional variables may significantly influence our 
dependent variable, in which case the estimates of column (1) could be biased. To allow 
for this we repeat the estimation including various sets of the controls identified in the 
previous section.  These are reported in columns (2)–(5) of Table 2 and show the controls 
to be statistically significant most of the time.  More important for our purposes, 
however, is that the inclusion of these controls does not alter the signs of the size and 
openness coefficients, which remain consistent with the Hines-Summers Hypothesis.  
Moreover, the coefficients of both variables are generally statistically significant when 
the controls are included. 
Table 3 presents the results obtained when the dependent variable is . Columns 
(1) – (5) of Table 3 are organized in a manner similar to that of Table 2.  It is apparent 
that the results from all the different specifications estimated are consistent with the 
Hines-Summers Hypothesis. In particular, the estimated coefficient of size is negative 
and statistically significant, while the coefficient of openness is positive and statistically 
significant, as well.  It is also worth noticing that most of the controls enter the  and  
regressions with opposite signs, so that size and openness are not unique in that regard.  
<<Table 3 here>> 
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For robustness purposes we have also estimated equations (5) and (6) with several 
different methods: i) country-specific fixed effects (our baseline method); ii) country- and 
time-specific fixed effects, iii) country-specific fixed effects and random time effects; iv) 
Instrumental Variables, in which openness and size are instrumented by their own lags; 
and v) Instrumental Variables and time-specific fixed effects. 
The results (not reported here because of space considerations, but available on 
request) confirm the validity of the Hines-Summers Hypothesis. In particular, for the 
fraction of revenue from income taxes the coefficient of openness is negative and that of 
size is positive; while for the fraction of revenue from expenditure taxes the coefficient of 
openness is positive and the one associated with size is negative. 
As an additional robustness check we try to assess whether our findings would be 
robust to different measures of “openness”.  In particular, we ask whether our results are 
robust to using financial openness instead of trade openness.  To this purpose we use the 
two measures of financial integration proposed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [2007].  The 
first is the share of the total stock of external asset and liabilities to GDP, while the 
second is the share of the sum of the total stock of portfolio asset and liabilities and the 
stock of direct investment asset and liabilities to GDP.  The results we obtain when 
equations (5) and (6) are estimated for these two alternative measures of openness are 
reported in Table 4.  These results confirm for both measures the negative relationship 
between financial openness and the income tax share, and the positive relationship 
between financial openness and the expenditure tax share.  This, together with the fact 
that the results obtained for the coefficients of size are unaffected, is once again 
consistent with the Hines-Summers Hypothesis. 
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<<Table 4 here>> 
Finally, we combine the models of equations (5) and (6), using the ratio of income 
to expenditure taxes as the dependent variable:7 
R
titititiE
ti
Y
ti opensize ,,,2,10
,
, εθθθ
τ
τ
++++= Xδ'               (7) 
The predictions of the Hines-Summers Hypothesis now become 1θ
 
> 0, and 2θ  < 0.  Table 
5 reports various specifications of model (7).  As expected, the coefficients of size are 
indeed positive and statistically significant, while those of openness are negative and also 
statistically significant.  This of course confirms that larger and/or less open economies 
have higher ratios of income to expenditure taxes. 
<<Table 5 here>> 
Summarizing, we find that our results paint fundamentally the same picture: all 
components of the Hines-Summers Hypothesis can claim broad, statistically significant, 
and robust empirical support. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper investigated the effects of economic size and trade openness on tax 
design in the OECD.  We believe this is a worthwhile exercise not only because different 
types of taxes are well known to have different effects on economic activity and welfare, 
but also because observable differences in tax design across OECD countries are quite 
large. 
 Our main goal has been to test the Hines-Summers [2009] hypothesis which 
predicts that the reliance on income taxes should be increasing with economic size and 
 10
decreasing with openness; while, on the contrary, reliance on expenditure taxes should be 
decreasing with economic size and increasing with openness. 
Our results show that the Hines-Summers Hypothesis can claim broad, 
statistically significant, and robust empirical support in the OECD data sets we examined.  
In particular, the smaller the size and the greater the openness of the economy, the more it 
has relied on expenditure taxes and the less on income taxes. 
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Notes 
 
1. For a comprehensive review on tax competition see Wilson [1999]. 
 
2. See; for example; Tanzi [1995]; Dhillon et al .[1999]; Peralta and van Ypersele [2002]; 
Brueckner [2006]; Dhillon et al. [2007]; Devereux et al. [2008];  Hauptmeer et al. [2009]. 
 
3. These hypotheses have been extensively tested in the literature [Garrett (1996); Garrett 
(1998a); Garrett (1998b); Rodrik (1997); Hallerberg and Badinger; (1998); Swank 
(1998); Grubert (2001); Swank and Steimmo (2002); Slemrod (2004)]. 
 
4. As Table 1 below makes clear, Eti ,τ  and 
Y
ti,τ  do not add up to one because of the 
existence of other categories of taxes, such as property taxes, social security 
contributions, and “other” taxes. 
5. Country selection is dictated by data availability only. 
6. The correlation coefficient is –0.40 for the sample of all 30 countries, and –0.40 for the 
Full-Data subsample.  
 
7. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this test. 
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Table 1. Sample Means 
 
                                                              Yτ        Eτ        size       open  
                                                                                                                                                                                  . 
  1. Australia  55.6      30.1       1.55      33.4       
  2. Austria      26.8      31.9       0.81      71.2       
  3. Belgium      37.0      28.1       1.01     127.8       
  4. Canada      45.6      29.7       2.87      56.9       
  5. Czech Republic     24.1      31.3       0.24     120.2       
  6. Denmark      57.1      35.2       0.70      71.3       
  7. Finland      40.5      34.0       0.50      57.8       
  8. France      18.2      30.3       5.72      42.6       
  9. Germany      32.4      28.1       8.19      61.4       
10. Greece      18.0      43.0       0.65      44.7       
11. Hungary      23.5      38.5       0.23     111.8       
12. Iceland      31.9      51.7       0.03      72.1       
13. Ireland      35.0      43.9       0.28     115.2       
14. Italy      30.0      29.4       4.80      41.7       
15. Japan       42.5      18.0      19.16      21.9       
16. Korea      28.5      49.5       1.34      65.0       
17. Luxembourg      39.6      24.4       0.06     201.6       
18. Mexico      26.4      55.0       2.16      34.3       
19. Netherlands      30.3      27.1       1.55     107.8       
20. New Zealand      63.0      29.5       0.23      55.3       
21. Norway      39.2      36.3       0.64      73.6       
22. Poland      26.7      34.9       0.67      57.4       
23. Portugal      23.7      43.6       0.42      58.3       
24. Slovakia      20.4      36.3       0.09     139.6       
25. Spain      26.0      28.9       2.33      38.6       
26. Sweden      43.7      26.3       1.10      65.0       
27. Switzerland      44.7      23.8       1.21      71.0       
28. Turkey      35.3      39.2       0.95      25.5       
29. UK      38.7      30.6       6.34      51.3       
30. USA      47.1      18.4      37.96      18.9       
 
   Notes: Yτ  is the fraction of total tax revenue from income taxes (defined as taxes on income, 
profits and capital gains); Eτ  is the fraction of total tax revenue from expenditure taxes (defined 
as taxes on goods and services); size is the country’s GDP in US dollars as a fraction of total 
OECD GDP in US dollars; and open is trade openness measured by the sum of exports plus 
imports divided by GDP.   
    The 23 countries in bold (the Full-Data countries) have data available for the entire period of 
1965-2007.  The other seven economies have shorter time periods. 
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 Table 2. Dependent Variable: Income tax share -- Country Fixed Effects 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) 
 Openness -0.017 
(-1.49) 
-0.014 
(-1.22) 
-0.029 
(-2.31)** 
-0.026 
(-2.02)** 
-0.044 
(-3.55)*** 
 Size 2.068 
(3.94)*** 
6.454 
(10.38)*** 
4.184 
(7.32)*** 
1.745 
(2.12)** 
8.261 
(8.12)*** 
       
Demographic  
controls 
Population - -0.103 
(-6.03)*** 
- - -0.040 
(-2.08)** 
 Rural 
Population 
- 0.158 
(3.85)*** 
- - 0.141 
(3.03)***
 Population 
Density 
- -0.133 
(-10.19)*** 
- - -0.183 
(-9.63)***
Macroeconomic 
controls 
Unemployment 
rate 
-  -0.067 
(-1.35) 
- -0.276 
(-4.99)***
 Inequality (Gini 
coefficient) 
-  -46.724 
(-7.28)*** 
- -40.690 
(-6.13)***
Political 
controls 
Presidential -  - 3.978 
(4.80)*** 
2396.125 
(5.03)***
 Proportional -  - -0.001 
(-0.28) 
-4.784 
(-5.02)***
 Left -  - -0.162 
(-0.60) 
-0.362 
(-1.37) 
       
Adjusted-R2  0.87 0.89 0.89 0.91 0.93 
N  1109 1073 927 724 607 
       
T-statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively. 
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Table 3. Dependent Variable: Expenditure tax share -- Country Fixed Effects 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Openness 0.062 
(6.69)*** 
0.039 
(4.01)*** 
0.066 
(6.30)*** 
0.034 
(3.15)*** 
0.025 
(2.31)*** 
 Size -8.214 
(-17.93)*** 
-8.861 
(-17.23)*** 
-9.994 
(-20.34)***
-3.781 
(-5.34)*** 
-8.304 
(-10.61)***
       
Demographic  
controls 
Population - 0.041 
(3.16)*** 
- - 0.025 
(2.34)** 
 Rural 
Population 
- -0.066 
(-1.53) 
- - -0.165 
(-3.77)*** 
 Population 
Density 
- 0.074 
(6.27)*** 
- - 0.158 
(9.72)*** 
Macroeconomic 
controls 
Unemployment 
rate 
-  -0.112 
(-2.73)*** 
- 0.085 
(1.76)* 
 Inequality (Gini 
coefficient) 
-  51.690 
(8.98)*** 
- 12.385 
(1.88)* 
Political 
controls 
Presidential -  - -1.947 
(-1.55) 
-4524.125 
(-6.98)*** 
 Proportional -  - 0.004 
(1.51) 
9.050 
(-6.98)*** 
 Left -  - 0.655 
(2.29)** 
0.179 
(0.76) 
       
Adjusted-R2  0.85 0.85 0.88 0.88 0.91 
N  1109 1073 927 724 607 
       
T-statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively. 
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Table 4. Two Measures of Financial openness -- Country Fixed Effects 
  Income tax share Expenditure tax share 
  1st measure 2nd 
measure 
1st measure 2nd 
measure 
 Openness -0.069 
(-1.92)* 
-1.000 
(-2.09)** 
0.073 
(2.68)*** 
0.116 
(3.32)*** 
 Size 8.328 
(9.69)*** 
8.155 
(9.59)*** 
-9.214 
(-13.58)*** 
-9.059 
(-13.92)*** 
      
      
Adjusted-R2  0.94 0.94 0.92 0.92 
N  542 542 607 607 
      
T-statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively. Estimates relative to the full specification in which all controls are included, but not 
reported.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Dependent Variable: Ratio of Income to Expenditure taxes 
  Baseline D M P D+M+P 
 Openness -0.002 
(-3.00)*** 
-0.002 
(-2.39)** 
-0.003 
(-3.40)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.31) 
-0.002 
(-2.13)** 
 Size 0.253 
(7.60)*** 
0.363 
(10.36)*** 
0.392 
(10.61)*** 
0.021 
(0.37)*** 
0.475 
(7.18)*** 
       
       
Adjusted-R2  0.83 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.87 
N  1109 1073 927 724 607 
       
T-statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively. D refers to the inclusion of demographic controls; M refers to the inclusion of 
macroeconomic controls; P refers to the inclusion of political controls; D+M+P all controls are included. 
Estimates relative to the full specification in which all controls are included, but not reported.   
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